IT IS USEFUL to warn, as Jeremy Bulow and Kenneth Rogoff do in another paper in this issue, that "debt reduction" is not necessarily a panacea for heavily indebted countries. Many of the new schemes for debt reduction, such as exit bonds, buybacks, and debt-equity swaps, can be a poor deal for a debtor country, even when it is thereby enabled to retire debt at a discount relative to face value. It may make little sense for a debtor country to nibble away at its debt in a series of piecemeal transactions in which a bit of debt is repurchased at a discount in each transaction. Debt-equity swap programs, and other "voluntary debt reduction" schemes in the U.S. Treasury's so-called menu of options, almost always have this piecemeal character. It is no accident that Citicorp, rather than the debtor countries, is the world's leading advocate of debt-equity swaps.
institutions. Finally, I will show why the Bolivian case is a successful example of a comprehensive strategy of debt reduction, one that has been to the benefit of Bolivia and its creditors as well.
The General Case for Debt Reduction Operations
The analytical framework used in the Bulow-Rogoff paper is a useful starting point. In that framework, there is no particular reason for a debtor country to pursue debt reduction, even if it is of a comprehensive nature-a buyback of all of the debt. Consider a country that is so hopelessly over-indebted that its debt has a secondary market value of 5 percent of face value, say $50 million on $1 billion of principal. In the Bulow-Rogoff framework, the $50 million represents the present value of expected payments on the debt and therefore the full burden of the 'debt, in the sense that the country should never pay more than $50 million even to buy the entire $1 billion of debt from the creditors and thereby resolve the debt crisis.
But, in reality, there is a burden of the debt that goes beyond the expected repayments, reflecting the various costs to the country of being in default.I A country that owes $1 billion on which it can pay only an expected $50 million will face great difficulty in new borrowing, even for highly productive investments.2 It will face high bargaining costs in handling the $1 billion of bad debt.3 It will face sanctions from disgruntled creditors, such as a withdrawal of trade credits, that will hinder its future economic performance.4 It will face a major internal disincentive to economic reforms that increase the debt service capacity of the country, since the costs of reform are borne by the country while many of the benefits of reform will be appropriated by creditors who receive higher repayments in the event of reform.5
For these reasons, it may well be beneficial for the country to pay much more than the $50 million (in present-value terms) to cancel the overhang of $1 billion of mostly bad debts. These payments could come in the form of a direct cash buyback, especially if the country can borrow the funds for the buyback from friendly governments, or some other arrangement where future debt payments of over $50 million are guaranteed by the debtor country. A cash-starved country would obviously prefer to find ways to make the present value of payments in the future, rather than with current cash.6 In either case, however, by eliminating the overhang, the country would avoid the costs of default and regain the incentives for internal reform.
The Bulow and Rogoff framework is generally correct, however, for demonstrating that paying more than the $50 million makes sense only if most or all of the debt overhang is thereby solved 4. Even if the banks know that the debt cannot be paid, they may still impose sanctions for nonpayment to impress other debtors with whom they are negotiating.
5. Consider a case of an economic reform that would cost $100 million of current consumption and raise the debtor's future income and debt servicing capacity by $200 million in present value. Suppose that all of this incremental debt servicing capacity would be squeezed out of the country by the foreign creditors in the course of future negotiations. The debtor has no incentive to undertake the reform, despite its high return, because the benefits accrue to the foreign creditors. However, if the country first entered into a buyback, in which it paid $60 million for the $1 billion in debt, thereby canceling the debt overhang, it would then be free to undertake the investment and to reap the large returns.
Notice that this incentive effect could work through the incentives on a given government (by leading the government officials to a rejection of specific public investments or public sector reforms), or through the electoral process, by contributing to the election of governments that oppose the reform efforts.
6. As an example, the country could negotiate with creditors to use the receipts of future export earnings as collateral for future debt service payments, in cases where it would be administratively possible to arrange for future export earnings to accumulate in an escrow account out of reach of the country. has proved that even marginal buyback operations can be beneficial under some circumstances, if the deadweight burden of the debt is high enough).7 It will usually make little sense, for example, for the country to pay $6 million of cash in a one-shot transaction to reduce its debt by $100 million of face value if there remains $900 million of mostly bad debt on the books.8
This negative assessment of most small buybacks is reinforced when we step back from a static model and view a small buyback in a more realistic multiperiod context. In a buyback, the country uses current cash to repurchase principal that has been rescheduled for many years. The current contractual burden on the debt that is repurchased is only the interest due. If the repurchase price of the debt is greater than the interest rate-for example, if the debt sells for 50 cents on the dollar, when interest rates are 10 cents perdollarof debt-then acash repurchase reflects an acceleration of payments on the debt, even though the debt is bought at a discount. For this reason, debt-equity swaps tend to impose an enormous cash flow burden on the debtor country. Governments involved in anti-inflation programs are, for this reason as well, strongly advised to avoid debt-equity swap programs, which are usually pressed upon them by the banks.
Why Comprehensive Deals Are Hard to Make
Even mutually advantageous debt reduction schemes, in which the debtor clears the debt overhang and the creditors raise the total value of payments that they receive, are unlikely to occur under the current official debt management strategy. The reasons are not far to seek. First, heavily exposed banks have an inherent incentive to reject buyback deals, even when they are efficient from the point of view of banks as a whole-that is, when they raise the market value of overall debt repayments.9 Second, the U.S. government, the main arbiter of 7. See Rotemberg, "Sovereign Debt Buybacks." 8. Note that the country might have to pay 6 percent on the transaction, even if the current secondary market price of the debt is 5 percent, since the repurchase would tend to drive up the price on the remaining debt.
9. The perverse incentives that I am discussing affect only four or five U.S. banks. They are, however, among the biggest. They include Citicorp, Bank of America, Chemical Bank, Chase Manhattan, and Manufacturers Hanover. Outside the United States, there are probably no banks at all in the situation under discussion. the kind of deals that take place, has vetoed almost all comprehensive debt reduction schemes on behalf of the most heavily exposed banks. Third, negotiations over the debt of smaller countries are guided by the creditors' concerns over precedent for the large debtors, rather than for the efficiency of the outcome for the small debtor. It is generally thought best to strangle a little country, even at the expense of the country's debt servicing, if it sends a convincing signal to Brazil and Mexico to keep paying the debt.
Why would a heavily exposed bank reject a comprehensive deal? Suppose that a bank holds $100 million of debt at face value, with $90 million in liabilities to depositors, and $10 million of book value of shareholders' equity. If the debt is worth only 5 percent of face value, then the bank cannot meet its liabilities in present value, and should be liquidated by the regulators.
In practice, however, the regulators would allow the bank to keep the debt on the books at face value ($100 million) rather than market value ($5 million), and the depositors would be fully insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The bank managers, acting on behalf of the shareholders, would try to continue to run the bank, on the chance that some highly profitable investments will come along and put the bank into the black. 10 The bank would have a positive market value despite having assets worth less than liabilities, reflecting the option value on future investment opportunities, combined with the FDIC guarantees.
How would the bank regard a cash buyback in which the debtor pays $100 million for the $1 billion of debt? Obviously it should reject the deal, even though the market value of the debt would go up, since it would be forced to write down the face value of the debt.1' The bank would immediately be liquidated after the buyback, since the regulators would have to act on a bank with negative book value. The FDIC should be delighted with the buyback since it would reduce the FDIC's likely long-term cost of paying off the depositors, but the bank managers and shareholders would reject the buyback proposal.
Even if the buyback did not force a liquidation, it could well force a change of bank management, by reducing the book value of capital 10. As with the savings and loans in the mid-1980s, the banks would also have the incentive to go after highly profitable, highly risky ventures (as perhaps with money-center financing of leveraged buyouts in the mid-1980s).
11. The buyback constitutes an "accounting event" that forces the bank to mark to market value all of the assets involved. enough to force the intervention of the bank regulators. Thus, even for heavily exposed banks not at risk of insolvency, bank managers might oppose buybacks for fear of losing theirjobs .
Few, if any, banks in the United States would now be placed at fundamental risk by a widespread write-down on claims on the LDCs, but U.S. policymakers have not wanted to test that proposition. They have acted with one goal in mind: prevent a process that could escalate into widespread write-downs, which in turn might threaten the survival of current management of even one or two of the most heavily exposed banks. And it is the U.S. government, even more than the banks themselves, that determines the parameters of the debt negotiating process. So far, the U.S. government, working in tandem with the most heavily exposed money-center banks, has rejected virtually all attempts at a comprehensive settlement of the debt. Although its remaining debt is still deeply discounted, Bolivia's 18. Among the complex reasons for this change of position, the most important was the ferocity of the economic crisis in Bolivia, combined with the strength of Bolivia's adjustment program, which eliminated tens of thousands of jobs in state enterprises and closed the budget deficit by more than 10 percent of GNP almost overnight. Also the United States had important foreign policy interests in stabilizing democracy in Bolivia, which borders most of the large countries of South America and has often been feared as a center of unrest (Che Guevara's death in the Bolivian jungles in 1967 being a case in point). Moreover, the United States was interested in pursuing an anti-cocaine policy in the region, and could accomplish it only with a friendly, stable government.
19. Bolivia was one of the few countries subject to an ATRR (allocated transfer risk reserve), in which the U.S. regulators force a write-down in book value of the debt. Intentionally, the regulators have avoided any forced write-downs for the largest debtor countries. position is much improved from what it was before the buyback. UnderSachs argues that efficiency-enhancing buybacks have been blocked by a U.S. government whose Latin American foreign policy has been deeply concerned with protecting current bank management. Our view is that the banks and countries have not negotiated comprehensive debt restructurings primarily because the feasible efficiency gains are not very large.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that our analysis is not sensitive to whether the funds for a buyback come from the debtor country's own cash reserves or from third-party donors. Our message is that a wellintentioned donor government can help the debtor country more by giving it aid directly than by earmarking the same funds for a buyback.
